The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

The Hale Foundation

"I wish to be useful, and every kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious."

—Capt. Nathan Hale
1755-1776

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[President Reagan has pledged to revive the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, abolished by President Carter in 1977. This paper is designed to assist public understanding of PFIAB's past role and the manner in which it can contribute to future national security.]

Origin and Brief History

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was established by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in February 1956 as the "President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities." Creation of the Board was based on a recommendation of the second Hoover Commission.

The first Hoover Commission (Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government), so-called because it was chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, was created in 1947 to undertake a comprehensive study of the organization and administration of governmental elements directed by the President. The second commission, created on July 10, 1953, by unanimous vote of a Congress impressed with work of the first, was empowered to study those same matters and was also specifically directed to make policy recommendations.

The Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities, one of 14 created to carry out its mission, was headed by Gen. Mark W. Clark (Ret.), then president of The Citadel, who had commanded the Allied ground forces in Italy in World War II, and U.S. and UN forces during the Korean War, and had also served as U.S. High Commissioner for Austria, as Deputy to the Sec-

retary of State in London and Moscow with the Council of Foreign Ministers negotiating the post World War II Austrian Treaty, and in other important posts.

The Clark Task Force prepared two reports. One was made public in June 1955. The other was classified "TOP SECRET" and not submitted to the Commission but delivered to the President because, the Task Force said, of its "extremely sensitive content."

The public report made nine recommendations to improve the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence. The second of these was that *Congress* create a "small, permanent, bipartisan commission," patterned after the Hoover Commission and thus composed of members of the House, the Senate and "public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence"—

> ...to make periodic surveys of the organization, functions, policies, and results of the Government agencies handling foreign intelligence operations....The proposed "watchdog" commission should be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needed for its own use....Appointments by the President of persons from private life to the proposed Commission should be made from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the Nation.

This commission, the Task Force said, should report its findings and recommendations, "under adequate security safeguards," to Congress and the President annually and "as necessary and advisable."

The Hoover Commission accepted the basic concept in this recommendation, but somewhat altered its application. Its final report recommended that *the President* appoint—

> ...a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities. This committee should also give such information to the public as the President may direct.

The Commission also recommended that *Congress* "consider" creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. It noted that if these two steps were taken, the two committees, one presidential and one congressional, "could collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security."

It did not adopt the Intelligence Task Force recommendation for a combined committee, the Hoover Commission said, because it believed that—

> ...while mixed congressional and citizens committees for temporary service are useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties.

The Commission report was submitted to Congress and the President on June 29, 1955. Congress rejected its recommendation. Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) had introduced a resolution to create a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence earlier in the year but, even with the Commission's endorsement, it was defeated 59-27 when finally brought to a vote in the Senate on April 11, 1956.

Meanwhile, about six months after receiving the Hoover Commission report, President Eisenhower announced—on January 13, 1956—that he was implementing its recommendation and named those he was appointing to the committee it had proposed. On February 8, he issued Executive Order 10656, retroactively effective to January 13, formally establishing the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities and spelling out its duties.

He created the Board, the President's order said, "to enhance the security of the United States and the conduct of its foreign affairs by furthering the availability of intelligence of the highest order."

Eisenhower appointed eight members to the Board, designating one of them—Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology—as chairman. In a message to the members, he went beyond the generalities of his executive order in pinpointing the work he wanted

the Board to do:

> While the review by your group would be concerned with all Government foreign intelligence activities, I would expect particular detailed attention to be concentrated on the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and of those intelligence elements of key importance in other departments and agencies. I am particularly anxious to obtain your views as to the overall progress that is being made, the quality of training and personnel, security, progress in research, effectiveness of specific projects and of the handling of funds, and general competence in carrying out assigned intelligence tasks.

As is normal in cases of Presidential appointees, all members of the Eisenhower Board resigned toward the end of his term (on January 7, 1961) to make way for the new President's appointees.

President John F. Kennedy did not appoint a new Board immediately after assuming office. According to one writer, this was because he considered it and the Operations Coordinating Board (which he abolished in February 1961) "useless impediments, bureaucratic obstructions to a vigorous, activist foreign policy."*

The April 1961 Bay of Pigs failure, however, apparently changed Kennedy's mind. Less than one month later, on May 4, 1961, he issued Executive Order 10938, rescinding the Eisenhower order, and creating the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). Basically, this order did no more than change the Board's name. Its duties, as delineated in his order, were fundamentally the same as those of the Board created by Eisenhower.

President Kennedy first appointed seven members to his Board. Three were holdovers from the Eisenhower Administration—Dr. Killian, who was renamed chairman, Lt. Gen. James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle, USAF (Ret.), chairman of the board of Space Technologies, Inc., and Dr. William O. Baker, vice president for research, Bell Telephone Laboratories. A month later, on May 15, he named two more members.

President Lyndon B. Johnson retained the Board that had been serving President Kennedy at the time of his assassination and made no changes in the Kennedy PFIAB executive order. Clark Clifford, an advisor to President Kennedy and former special counsel to President Truman who had succeeded Dr. Killian as chairman of PFIAB, was retained in that position.

President Richard M. Nixon issued a new Board Executive Order (#11460) on March 20, 1969. This order, too, made no substantial change in the Board's role and duties as adviser to the President on foreign intelligence matters.

Nixon appointed 10 members to the Board, naming Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, president of the Institute for Defense Analysis, as chairman. About half of his appointees, including Gen. Taylor, had served on the Board under earlier Presidents. He later made six additional appointments to replace members who resigned at various times during his term in office.

President Gerald R. Ford initially retained the Board as it existed at the time of President Nixon's resignation under the chairmanship of Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations and Ambassador to Portugal, who had succeeded Gen. Taylor as PFIAB chairman when the latter resigned in 1970.

Later, on March 9, 1976, Ford announced that he was expanding the Board to 17 members and designated Leo Cherne, executive director of the Research Institute of America, as its new chairman. The purpose of this expansion, he said, was to strengthen the U.S. intelligence effort:

> The intelligence needs of the '70s and beyond require the use of highly sophisticated technology. Furthermore, there are new areas of concern which demand our attention. No longer does this country face only military threats. New threats are presented in such areas as economic reprisal and international terrorism. The combined experience and expertise of the members of this Board will be an invaluable resource as we seek solutions to the foreign intelligence problems of today and the future.
>
> * * *
>
> By strengthening the Board as I have done today, and by giving the Board my full

*Powers, *The Man Who Kept The Secrets*, p. 169.

personal support, I fully anticipate that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board will continue its indispensable role in advising me on the effectiveness of our foreign intelligence efforts.

The previous month, Ford had taken another step that was to have bearing on the role of PFIAB. Following the investigations of the Church and Pike committees into alleged intelligence wrongdoings and his receipt of the Rockefeller Commission report on the CIA, Ford, on February 18, 1976, issued the first Presidential Executive Order (#11905) establishing the composition, management, control, responsibilities and restrictions on U.S. foreign intelligence activities.

This order created a new entity, a three-man Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) charged with policing intelligence operations for any activities of questionable legality or propriety and considering reports on such matters from agency inspectors general and general counsels. Ford named Robert D. Murphy, famed diplomatic trouble shooter and chairman of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy ("Murphy" Commission) who had been a member of PFIAB during the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations, as chairman. The other two IOB members he appointed were Leo Cherne, who he was to name as chairman of PFIAB less than a month later, and attorney Stephen Ailes.

E.O. 11985 13 May 1977

President Jimmy Carter did not appoint a new PFIAB following his inauguration. A few months later, on May 4, 1977, he issued Executive Order 11984, revoking Nixon's March 1969 Board order (which had remained in effect throughout the Ford Administration) and abolishing PFIAB.

Carter's intelligence executive order of January 24, 1978 (#12036), however, did retain the IOB as an intelligence "watchdog" or policeman.

During the Carter Administration, for the first time in over 20 years, the President and the intelligence community lacked the assistance of an independent, experienced, high-level advisory group of private sector and former public officials in conducting intelligence operations vital to the nation's security.

PFIAB's Organization and Operations

PFIAB, per the executive orders authorizing its establishment and functions, did not have a fixed number of members. Presidents appointed as many members as they desired to serve on it. Most Chief Executives preferred a limited membership. As already indicated, President Eisenhower appointed eight members, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had nine, and President Nixon, 10. President Ford's Board of 17 members had almost double the number of the original Eisenhower Board. 2 x 8 = 16 !

President Eisenhower, as the Hoover Commission had recommended, directed that Board members would serve without pay, being entitled only to standard government per diem and travel allowances for actual working periods. President Kennedy's order changed this, entitling members to compensation (the $100 per day consultants fee provided by law for such service). This change was continued in President Nixon's order. Some PFIAB members accepted this compensation, others did not.

Eisenhower's order provided that members would have to execute an oath not to reveal any classified information acquired through their service on the Board. This practice was continued throughout the Board's existence, although not specifically required by the Kennedy or Nixon orders.

PFIAB was directed to report its findings and recommendations to the President semi-annually by the Eisenhower and Kennedy orders. The Nixon order, also operative in the Ford Administration, had no regular reporting requirement. Under all orders, the Board was authorized to report to the President whenever it deemed it appropriate.

The Director of Central Intelligence and the various intelligence agencies, under the Eisenhower order, were merely "authorized" to make available to the Board any information it needed to carry out its responsibilities. The Kennedy and Nixon orders directed that they "shall make" such information available.

All Presidents provided the Board with a small, full-time staff, usually composed of an executive secretary and assistant, plus two or three secre-

taries, although President Nixon's order was the first to direct that PFIAB would have "a staff headed by an Executive Secretary...[and including]...such personnel as may be necessary" for its duties. The Board was also empowered to use outside consultants as needed and to draw on intelligence agencies for additional assistance.

PFIAB generally met in two-day sessions approximately every two months. In addition to occasional meetings with Presidents, the Board or its individual members routinely held consultations with intelligence officials, Cabinet members, the President's national security advisers and key policy makers. On occasions, members visited foreign intelligence installations abroad to obtain information needed to assist them in their advisory and review duties.

Issues considered by the Board arose from these consultations, from Presidential requests and suggestions of its members.

A 1975 analysis of PFIAB by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, based on information supplied by the Board's staff, revealed that in the 18-year period from its creation by President Eisenhower in 1956 through the Nixon Administration (1974), the Board had met 108 times, had had 25 meetings with the four Presidents it served during that period, and had submitted approximately 200 recommendations to them—for an average of 27 meetings in each administration, six with each President and approximately 50 recommendations submitted to each Chief Executive. The actual breakdown in each administration was as follows:

President	Bd. Mtgs.	Mtgs. with President	Recommendations
Eisenhower ('56-'60)	19	5	42+
Kennedy ('61-'63)	25	9	53+
Johnson ('63-'68)	29	3	16+
Nixon ('69-'74)	35	8	70+
Total	**108**	**25**	**181+**

Because the Board's findings and recommendations were classified, specifics about the nature of its recommendations are not available. The Library of Congress analysis revealed, however, that among others, Board recommendations had dealt with the following general subjects:

- Control and coordination of the intelligence community, particularly in the area of covert action.
- Improved strategic warning systems.
- Management of the National Security Agency.
- General development and improvement of U.S. intelligence capabilities.
- Establishment of the U.S. Intelligence Board.
- Improved methods of handling sensitive intelligence.
- Closer Defense Department supervision of NSA operations.
- More effective coordination and evaluation of covert action.
- Improvement of science and technology applied to intelligence collection.
- Consolidation and reorganization of various defense-related intelligence activities.
- Development of photographic reconnaissance capabilities.
- Review of CIA paramilitary operations.
- Establishment of Directorate of Science and Technology in CIA.
- Legislation relating to NSA activities.
- Revision of functions of the National Security Council group which approved or disapproved covert action and paramilitary operations to ensure political control and review of such activities.
- Investigations into satellite reconnaissance systems.
- Date storage and retrieval systems.
- Deficiencies in the collection and analysis of intelligence from Southeast Asia.

PFIAB's Accomplishments

Disparagement of PFIAB has been a consistent theme in intelligence literature produced by those who can be described, at best, as hyper-critics of American intelligence and most individuals and agencies associated with it.

David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, in *The Invisible Government* (1964), the first of the intelligence muckraking works, claimed it was "apparent" that PFIAB had "great difficulty getting to the bottom of things" because it was composed of part-time consultants who met only occasionally. Eisenhower had created it, they alleged, only to head off closer scrutiny of U.S. intelligence activity by Congress (via the joint committee route) and considered it "more innocuous" than that alternative.

Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, in *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (1974), claimed that the majority of PFIAB members had "always" had close ties with the Pentagon and defense contractors and had "consistently pushed for bigger (and more expensive) intelligence collection systems." In addition, they alleged, it had "limited value" as a "watchdog" agency because it met only once a month, was merely advisory and lacked bureaucratic authority. Intelligence personnel, according to them, considered it "a nuisance" rather than a "true control mechanism," and Presidents had used it primarily as a "prestigious but relatively safe 'in-house' investigative unit" when they were unhappy with the intelligence they were receiving on some matter. PFIAB had actually compounded the intelligence community's problems, according to Marchetti-Marks, by taking the counterproductive position that they could always be solved "if only more data were collected by more-advanced systems."

Most of these criticisms—and some others that have been made—are based on the thesis that PFIAB was designed to be a "watchdog" that policed the CIA and other intelligence agencies to detect any wrongdoing. Whether these critics misconceived the Board's role, having failed to consult the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon executive orders specifying its functions, or whether they knowingly misrepresented its duties to make their criticisms plausible, the fact is that PFIAB was never intended to operate as an intelligence "watchdog." While both the Clark Task Force and Hoover Commission used that term in describing the kind of committee or commission they were proposing, they emphasized the positive aspects of oversight. Concern was expressed about possible abuses and the need to prevent them, but the need to bring intelligence "up to an acceptable level" was stressed, deep concern was expressed about certain intelligence gaps, the commission was urged to pay "special attention" to intelligence efficiency and effectiveness, the prevention of unnecessary overlapping and duplication, and the overall aim of the proposal was stated to be the promotion of "aggressive leadership" to make intelligence "more productive."

Most important, no President adopted the "watchdog" term in his orders, letters or statements concerning PFIAB's functions. Each made it clear that he did not intend it to serve as an intelligence policeman, but as a stimulus to improving both the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence.

President Eisenhower's stated purpose in creating the Board has already been quoted. Its basic duties, he said, were to conduct "objective review" and report to him on the agencies' foreign intelligence activities and performance and on such other intelligence-related matters as it deemed appropriate.

President Kennedy's order said PFIAB was to advise him on foreign intelligence and related activities "required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security," and to review and assess the functions of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

President Nixon specified that the Board's first dury was to advise him concerning "the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the...overall national intelligence effort"; that it was also to review and assess all agencies' foreign intelligence activities, consider and act on matters referred to it by them when Board support would "further the effectiveness" of U.S. intelligence and, finally, recommend actions "to achieve increased effectiveness of the Government's foreign intelligence effort in meeting national intelligence needs."

The wording of these three Presidential directives clearly refutes all criticisms of PFIAB

keyed to the premise that it was supposed to police intelligence activities. President Ford's March 1976 statement of his reasons for enlarging PFIAB's membership and his earlier establishment of the IOB as an intelligence policing agency do the same.

All Presidents perceived and directed PFIAB to be a reviewer and adviser in a positive sense, to propose new and more efficient means of obtaining essential foreign intelligence.

Other writers and reviewers in the intelligence field, more objective in outlook than most PFIAB critics and in position to be better informed, have sharply contrasting views of PFIAB's performance and the need for such an advisory group.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., Professor of Political Science at Brown University for the past 16 years, has been described as "probably the most knowledgeable person writing on American intelligence agencies today." He held high posts in the CIA during his 18 years service with the Agency, including that of Inspector General, and was CIA liaison officer with PFIAB from 1956 to 1962. In *The U.S. Intelligence Community* (1973) he gave this response to criticisms of PFIAB as an "establishment" organization inclined to go along with anything the intelligence agencies do and lacking qualifications to make useful evaluations:

> ...it is my view that such criticisms are invalid and are based more on prejudice than knowledge.
>
> The argument that the board is simply a mirror of the system ignores the broad experience of the members. It is a grave error to assume that because an individual served in the government he is an advocate of all that the intelligence agencies may do. Most board members are more familiar with the weaknesses than the strengths of the intelligence system. This background gives them the required expertise, that of intelligence consumers....it was my experience that the President's board was one of the severest critics of the intelligence system. It is noteworthy that many of its recommendations were adopted or served as the basis for later reorganizations.

At another point, contradicting the later claim of Marchetti-Marks that PFIAB "consistently" promoted more costly intelligence collection systems, he referred to it as one of the bodies "exerting constant pressure to keep [intelligence] expenditures down."

The Church Committee, which was certainly not overly kind to the Intelligence Community, took the view that the President needs an independent body such as PFIAB "to assess the quality and effectiveness of our foreign intelligence effort." It reported that—

> Board reports and recommendations have contributed to the increased effectiveness and efficiency of our foreign intelligence effort.
>
> * * *
>
> PFIAB, has served, in effect, as an intelligence "Kitchen Cabinet." The Board has been useful, in part, because its advice and recommendations have been *for* the President. As such, the executive nature of this relationship should be maintained.
>
> Over the years, many of PFIAB's recommendations have been adopted, and others have served as a basis for later reform or reorganization.

On the issue of the Board's specific contributions to improved intelligence, and thus to the national security, the Committee said:

> ...the Board played a significant role in the development of our overhead reconnaissance program. It has made recommendations on coordinating American intelligence activities; reorganizing Defense intelligence; applying science and technology to the National Security Agency, and rewriting the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs). The Board has conducted post-mortems on alleged intelligence failures and, since 1969, made a yearly, independent assessment of the Soviet strategic threat, thereby supplementing regular community intelligence assessments. Most recently, it has reported to the President on economic intelligence and human clandestine intelligence collection.

The Murphy Commission (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy), in its 1975 report, stated:

> In view of the special importance and sensitivity of intelligence, the Commission believes the President should have sources of advice independent of the...[Director of Central Intelligence]. The PFIAB should become the principal such source. In the past, PFIAB has played an important role in the development of technical collection systems, in conducting useful analysis of apparent intelligence failures, and in directing attention to new issues for intelligence concern.

The Rockefeller Commission (Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States) noted that PFIAB had not considered domestic intelligence activities, the only subject it was empowered to investigate, but that—

> ...in the early 1970s it explored the relationship between the CIA and the FBI in connection with foreign intelligence activities which could successfully be accomplished within the United States.
>
> Thus in June 1972, the Board recommended to the President that the jurisdictional lines be clarified, either legislatively or administratively, so that some government agency might undertake certain specific intelligence activities within the United States.

Additional information on the Board's contributions to American intelligence and overall security was provided in the Senate Intelligence Committee's January 13, 1981 hearing on President Reagan's nomination of William J. Casey, who had served as a member of PFIAB in the Ford Administration, to be Director of Central Intelligence.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) introduced into the record a statement supporting the Casey nomination from Leo Cherne, executive director of the Research Institute of America and, before his appointment as PFIAB chairman by President Ford in March 1976, a member of the Nixon and Ford Boards. Cherne's statement revealed that the Board, primarily on the urging of Casey, had made recommendations on the importance of economic, financial, petroleum and agricultural intelligence, high technology trade, and improvement in connections between intelligence producers and consumers (i.e., the intelligence agencies and top policy makers).

Cherne also wrote that the Board played a "catalytic role" in then CIA Director George Bush's adoption in 1976 of the "A-Team/B-Team" competitive analysis of the Soviet strategic threat, and that its last effort had been a "large undertaking", with the assistance of former Directors of Central Intelligence, top policy makers and military leaders, to identify future U.S. intelligence needs.

Casey himself testified that "big leaps" in U.S. intelligence collection capability had resulted from the thinking of PFIAB members such as Edwin H. Land, president of Polaroid, and Dr. William O. Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories (both of whom had served on the Board in several administrations).

The U-2

Casey's reference to Land's contributions to major U.S. intelligence advances was a reminder of the fact that, even before PFIAB was first established by President Eisenhower, a panel headed by Land and working under the President's Science Adviser, had proposed the concept of the U-2, the plane made world famous on May 1, 1960, when one piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union.

A jet-powered "glider" built for the CIA by Lockheed with a fuselage only 40 feet long and a wingspan about double that, the U-2 did not have to strain to momentarily reach great heights, but could cruise effortlessly for more than 9 hours at altitudes initially beyond the range of any known rocket or missile. In test and training flights it had easily (and secretly) broken the world altitude record of 65,889 feet set in 1955 by a British Canberra Mark II. For 4 years before Powers was shot down, former Air Force pilots recruited by the CIA had been overflying the Soviet Union in U-2s on reconnaissance missions—with the full knowledge of Soviet officials, who lacked any weapon that could touch them.

President Eisenhower said the U-2's accomplishments were "nothing short of remarkable." CIA Director Allan Dulles said it—

> ...could collect information with more speed, accuracy and dependability than could any agent on the ground. In a sense, its feats could be equaled only by the acquisition of technical documents directly from Soviet offices and laboratories. The U-2 marked a new high, in more ways than one, in the scientific collection of intelligence.

Powers himself later wrote that the U-2 revealed for the first time—

> ...a composite picture of military Russia, complete to airfields, atomic production sites, power plants, oil-storage depots, submarine yards, arsenals, railroads, missile factories, launch sites, radar installations, industrial complexes, antiaircraft defenses.

Land's concept of this fantastic plane is just one example of what the private sector, working through a body such as the PFIAB, can contribute to America's intelligence capability and security.

That U.S. intelligence continued to benefit tremendously by Land's service on PFIAB under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford is evident from Casey's confirmation testimony.

PFIAB's "A-Team/ B-Team" Achievement

The worst failure of American intelligence in the past two decades was not the fault of the CIA's "spies" (case officers and their recruited foreign agents) or covert actionists, but of the Agency's "intellectuals," the analysts in its Langley, Virginia, headquarters. These are the people who annually produce the one intelligence document that is more important to U.S. security and survival—and thus to the rights and liberties of American citizens—than any other, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).

NIEs, based on the latest, best and most comprehensive intelligence available, assess Soviet strategic intentions and capabilities. They decisively influence this country's most fundamental defense and foreign policy decisions. They determine, in effect, who will win any U.S.-Soviet conflict. If they are correct, then, given the tremendous U.S. capability that can always be mobilized to provide whatever defense is essential to survival, we will never be caught short and can always be assured of victory. If they are wrong, it can mean the end of a free United States of America. A Bay of Pigs failure pales by comparison.

Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), a member of a Senate Intelligence subcommittee which looked into the NIEs in 1977, summarized their continuing miscalculations as follows in the Casey confirmation hearings—

> ...few things have contributed to the danger that this country now finds itself in as the CIA's faulty national estimates over the last decade and decade-and-a-half. When the Soviets were beginning the greatest strategic buildup of all time, the CIA said the Soviets were unlikely to try to match us in numbers of missiles. When the Soviets approached our numbers, the CIA said they were unlikely to exceed it substantially. When they exceeded it substantially, the CIA said the Soviets would not try for the capability to try to fight and win a war against us. And now that the Soviets have nearly achieved that capability, the CIA's estimates tell us the Soviets cannot be sure it will work.

Senator Moynihan, also a member of the NIE subcommittee, stated in his report on the investigation that for a dozen years the NIEs "have by and large failed" and that U.S. strategic concepts based on them therefore "corresponded to the Soviet reality less and less as the years went by."

Since January 1977, when the question of grossly faulty NIEs became a national issue as the result of a leak, the full extent of their consistent underestimation of Soviet development and deployment of ICBMs, SLBMs, long-range bombers and other strategic weapons, their power, accuracy and related matters, have been the subject of numerous books, articles, papers

and speeches by outstanding scholars and defense specialists. The same is true of the NIEs erroneous findings on the exceedingly important question of Soviet intentions.

The ultimate result of the NIE miscalculations has been a major shift in the strategic balance. The United States became inferior, instead of superior. At tremendous cost, it is now in a race to rebuild its strategic capabilities before it is too late to defend its freedom and independence.

PFIAB deserves full credit for bringing about a correction in the NIEs and for the Nation's being alerted to its perilous defense posture. Its role in this development was spelled out in the February 1978 report of the subcommittee of which Senators Wallop and Moynihan were members, the Senate Intelligence Committee's Subcommittee on the Quality of Intelligence, chaired by Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-Ill.).

The highly publicized "A-Team/B-Team" analysis experiment, in which outside experts were brought in to weigh the same information available to the CIA's professional analysts in preparing their NIEs, the report said—

> ...stemmed from PFIAB's opinion that the NIEs had been underestimating the progress of Soviet strategic weapons. In an August 1975 letter to President Ford, PFIAB Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr. proposed that the President authorize the NSC [National Security Council] to institute a "competitive analysis."

CIA Director William E. Colby temporarily stymied this move by counterproposing that PFIAB should examine an NIE then in preparation before determining what action should be taken. PFIAB did this and found "weaknesses" in the new NIE. It then made further investigations of its own and, in April 1976, again proposed a competitive analysis experiment, to be carried out under the jurisdiction of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

Vice President George Bush had then succeeded Colby as DCI. He agreed with the idea and, the subcommittee reported—

> PFIAB commissioned three *ad hoc* outside groups (composing the "B Team") to examine the data available to the U.S. intelligence community's analysts (the "A Team") to determine whether such data would support conclusions on Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives different from those presented in the Community's NIEs.

The above statement is misleading, creating the erroneous impression that PFIAB selected the B Team (the report later states inaccurately that PFIAB "took an active role in the selection" of it). Actually, though involved in the organizational arrangements for the creation of the B Team, PFIAB left the actual selection of its members up to the DCI, believing it should not be involved in deciding who should serve on the competitive group. As Cherne told the Senate Intelligence Committee, the selection of the teams was "entirely the responsibility of the CIA."

The staff of the Stevenson subcommittee that produced the NIE report was so dovishly oriented and obviously biased against PFIAB that Senators Moynihan and Wallop attached separate views to its report, criticizing its overall tone and many of its statements and findings. Despite its obvious slant, however, the report still found that the PFIAB initiative was "legitimate...justifiable and desirable," that the B Team made "valid criticisms" and "useful recommendations," that "the estimative process needs improvement" and that outside critiques, as proposed by PFIAB, "should continue to be conducted."

The result of the A-Team/B-Team experiment was the most realistic NIE produced in many years, described in the press as "more somber" and revealing "increasingly ominous" Soviet trends. It had far-reaching positive effects on U.S. defense preparations. As just one example, President Carter, who had campaigned on a platform that called for further reductions in the defense budget, was eventually induced by more realistic NIEs to abandon this position and move toward increased defense spending.

PFIAB's perception of the deficiencies in the NIEs, its persistence in pushing for corrective measures, and the production of the 1976 NIE as a result of its efforts, probably constitute the greatest of the many contributions it made to U.S. security.

It is certainly one of the ironies of recent U.S.

history that PFIAB was abolished shortly after it had made its greatest contribution to the basic welfare of the American people and, in doing so, conclusively proved its worth.

PFIAB and the Oversight Issue

The Rockefeller Commission, in its June 6, 1975 report to the President, recommended that—

> The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA.

The Commission proceeded to list six functions it believed the Board should have in relation to the Agency. All except the first were advisory functions the Board had been carrying out under the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon directives. The first (and new) PFIAB function suggested by the Rockefeller Commission was:

> Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory authority.

The Commission also recommended that PFIAB be empowered to "audit and investigate" CIA expenditures and activities and that the CIA Inspector General be authorized to report directly to the Board, whenever he deemed it appropriate, after notifying the DCI. To carry out these added duties, the Commission said PFIAB should have a full-time chairman and a staff "appropriate to its role."

The Murphy Commission, reporting to the President exactly three weeks later, said it "notes favorably the recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission on strengthening the role of PFIAB."

The Church Committee, in its April 1976 report, disagreed with the idea that PFIAB should have oversight functions. Its final report, after mentioning the Rockefeller, Murphy and other similar proposals, stated:

> Whether PFIAB should adopt this oversight or "watchdog" function, or whether Congress should be involved in the activities of the Board is open to question. President Ford, in his Executive Order [for the Intelligence Community], decided against transforming the Board into a CIA watchdog. Instead, he created a new three-member Intelligence Oversight Board to monitor the activities of the intelligence community.
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> The Board has not been an executive "watchdog" of the CIA. To make it so would be to place the Board in an untenable position: adviser to the President on the quality and effectiveness of intelligence on the one hand and "policeman" of the intelligence community on the other. These roles conflict and should be performed separately.

It is fortunate that, as the Church Committee noted, President Ford rejected the Rockefeller-Murphy commissions' recommendations that PFIAB be given watchdog duties. His creation of a separate Intelligence Oversight Board to police intelligence agency activities was a better solution to the executive oversight problem.

Policing the community and auditing and investigating CIA expenditures and operations would unquestionably have required a full-time PFIAB chairman and greatly expanded staff. It would also have diverted the Board from its traditional—and more important—positive role of advising the President on how he could improve overall intelligence production while it spent valuable time nit-picking about dollars and cents, to a large extent duplicating the work of the Senate and House Intelligence committees which spend months of each year on this task before approving intelligence authorization bills.

In addition, making the chairmanship a full-time position would have further weakened PFIAB and diluted its ability to make significant contributions to the intelligence effort by making the chairman of the Board just one more government official, instead of a prestigious, independent outsider. It would also entail the danger of tying him so closely to the intelligence community that he might lose much of the "distance" and objectivity essential to his best performance as a key intelligence adviser to the President.

Moreover, despite the fact that President Ford

appointed two PFIAB members to the IOB when he created it, the type of high-level achievers best qualified to make positive intelligence suggestions are generally not well-suited, by training or inclination, for policing duties. And finally, because these two disparate functions generally require differing organizational structures for optimum results, it is better to assign them to separate bodies, with each free to structure itself in the manner best suited to its functions.

Benefits of Positive Oversight

America's world leadership in many areas served by the private sector is indisputable evidence that top-ranking industrialists, scientists, academicians and managers—particularly those in highly competitive fields and high-technology areas—possess vital, new knowledge and are capable of the type of innovative and imaginative thinking that can contribute greatly to this country's intelligence capabilities.

The same is true of those who have held high posts in the diplomatic, military and intelligence services. Despite some reverses over the years, the fact is that the United States government has been the recognized leader of the free world for several decades, that many who have held key posts in these services contributed importantly to this fact, and that they have a wealth of practical knowledge and experience that can be utilized to strengthen the Nation's intelligence effort. Serving on a voluntary basis in retirement, free of the bureaucratic limitations, rivalries, special interests—and political pressures—that once restricted their freedom or colored their thinking to some degree, they can more objectively assess the President's most compelling intelligence needs and how well they are being handled by the intelligence community than they could while on active duty.

PFIAB was the instrument through which the services of these two groups were used to strengthen the Nation's first line of defense in the past. Its revival will make them available again.

William J. Casey emphasized in his confirmation hearing as Director of Central Intelligence that it was necessary to "search for new and better ways to get continuing input from the outside world" to improve analysis and other elements of U.S. intelligence and that he intended to devote great effort to this. He then noted—

> A revival of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board can contribute substantially to this.

In one of his first major speeches as DCI, Casey said—

> ...the time has come to recognize that the intelligence community has no monopoly on truth, on insight, on initiative in foreseeing what will be relevant to policy. For that reason, we are in the process of reconstituting a President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board made up of strong and experienced individuals having a wide range of relevant backgrounds.

In addition to bringing in the best of relevant thinking, PFIAB can serve as an antidote to an occupational weakness of all highly specialized fields, including intelligence—loss of ability to see the forest for the trees. Intelligence professionals, like others, can become so intensely occupied with the minutiae of their craft that they may lose sight of the big, overall picture.

PFIAB undoubtedly missed some of the little trees in the intelligence forest that the professionals detected, but the more than 200 big picture recommendations it made to five Presidents demonstrate what an important asset it was in a basic security area. Its members, highly knowledgeable and experienced but not fully involved, were better able to perceive fundamental needs from a detached, more coldly analytical viewpoint.

Some of the professionals, of course, saw important defects when PFIAB did not and brought them to the Board's attention with the result that they were corrected—a fact that points up another advantage in an agency such as PFIAB. A President may be too busy to give an intelligence official the time he needs to spell out all his problems. With PFIAB available, if he has a good case, he has a friend in court. The President will find time to hear and consider PFIAB's recommendations. It is *his* Board; its chairman a

man he holds in high esteem.

The Clark Task Force pointed out another advantage in having a high-level, independent citizen advisory group such as PFIAB. Because intelligence agencies must operate in secrecy, some public concern about their activities is inevitable. This concern involves not only possible abuses, it said, but questions such as whether they are "producing the intelligence required for the security of the Nation."

Public knowledge that a group of highly respected private citizens was keeping its eye on such matters and reporting its findings to the President, it believed, would help allay such concerns, "shield our Intelligence program from unjustifiable attacks...and enhance public confidence and support of this vital work."

An added dividend that would flow from this increased public support, it noted, would be—

> ...public participation in the collection of overt Intelligence data....With such assurance, [the public] would develop an enthusiasm and alertness which could bring in valuable information at times to supplement the work of the regular Intelligence forces.

The ultimate test of the value of any institution is the opinion of informed people who have had extended practical experience under its influence or control. AFIO, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, has about 3,000 members, all veterans of the CIA, DIA, NSA, FBI, military intelligence services and other agencies with intelligence functions. Many who have held the highest posts in these services during the past quarter century are members of the group, along with larger numbers of middle managers and "street agents." There is probably no group in the country that equals its combined knowledge of, and experience in, intelligence in all its forms, and is better positioned to judge PFIAB's impact, for good or bad, on American intelligence. At its 1980 convention, AFIO adopted a resolution which advocated that—

> ...the President reestablish PFIAB to perform the functions in which it was formerly engaged and such other similar functions as the President finds appropriate.

The men and women who took this stand had worked primarily abroad but also at home under organizational and operational conditions, and with techniques, influenced in varying degrees by PFIAB during its 20-year existence. Whether top-level managers or collectors of intelligence in the back alleys and outposts of the world, they had experienced at first hand the impact of PFIAB's findings and recommendations to five U.S. Presidents. It is difficult to dispute their judgment about the desirability of reviving the Board.

Given the support PFIAB has received from the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions, the Church Committee, AFIO and others knowledgeable in the field, there can be little doubt that its revival will contribute materially to the national security through improved intelligence.